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GLOBAL CORPORATE REORGANIZATION/GLOBAL
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPERFECT
INFORMATION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT'
Bernhard Grossfeld2
-Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of
the whole world?'3
I. THE ISSUE
Global corporate reorganizations are no longer the subject of
overly zealous comparatists in corporate law and bankruptcy but an
issue of increasing practical importance.4 The Swiss Air collapse and
the recent Enron debacle are examples of bankruptcy proceedings with
thousands of creditors "in locations around the globe."5 They have
caused global ripple effects far beyond their "home states."
A. Corporate Reorganizations
Reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code are reserved for corporations trying to resur-
rect their business instead of auctioning off (liquidating) their assets to
the highest bidder under Chapter 7. Chapter 11 keeps the future
1 I borrowed the latter part of the title from Paul E. Fischer & Philip C. Stocken,
Imperfect Communication and Credible Commitment, 39 J. OF ACCT. RES. 119
(2001).
2 Professor of Law at the University of Muenster; Germany; LL.M. Yale 1963; Vis-
iting International Professor T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Rich-
mond, Fall 2001 & 2003.
3 Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in: Buchanan v. Rucker. (1808) 9 East 192, 103 Eng.
Rep. 546, 547 ; Hannah L. Busbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty
to Substance, 42 \A. J. INT'L L. 931 (Summer 2002).' See also VAX-ESSA FINCH, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAw (Cambridge Univ. Press
2001); Hannah L. Busbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected
Role of Choice-of-Law, Rules and Theory, 36 STA.. J. N-r'L L. 23 (2000); Vanessa
Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?, 62 MOD. L. REv. 633
(1999); Richard Hynes, Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 ComaELL L. REv. 696 (1999) [hereinafter A Post-Univer-
salist Approach]; John Purcell, International Insolvency Law at the Crossroads, 13
AusTL. L. REv. 304 (2002); Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, Asset Distribution
in Transnational Insolvencies: Combining Predictability and Protection of Local
Interests, 73 AM. BAXNKR. L. J. 385 (1999).
See also Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R.
282 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
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open. Chapter 7 is the traditional - and now even more frequent -
route for dead-end corporations. This article will first focus on the
stellar rise of Delaware as a prominent place for these procedures.
Second, the tendency to defend discharges on a global level, as ex-
pressed by Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Si-
mon).6 We might find by putting the names "Delaware" and
"Discharge" together that we will turn a new page in the "book" on
"global corporate actors and global corporate governance."7
B. Corporate Governance
The term "corporate governance" is often used to define the
ongoing social control over corporations from their incorporation
through their life. As long as "bankruptcy" referred mainly to the liq-
uidation of firms it was not seen as a corporate governance issue. This
changed with the rise of reorganizations. Indeed, the correlation be-
tween corporate law and bankruptcy is no accident. Reorganization
law is an extension of corporate law, as it is a kind of "revitalizing" of
the otherwise moribund entity, it is similar to a "re-incorporation:" a
re-structuring for a new future.' This affects creditors, shareholders
and other stakeholders - a process distinctively corporate in nature9:
"[flor large firms, corporate bankruptcy looks a great deal like corpo-
rate law."' °
Indeed, reorganization law is corporate law; it is federal corpo-
rate law and listing it under the name "bankruptcy" does not change
its character (consider Shakespeare's "what's in a name"). This is a full
circle back to the historical beginnings: corporate law can be under-
stood as a frontrunner of and a buffer for bankruptcy law. This
presents bankruptcy courts with conflict of law questions. The same
interest groups that influence choice of law in corporate law in general
(state of incorporation) will try to "color" reorganization proceedings
under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (venue state
for bankruptcy proceedings). Thus, it is a small wonder that the inter-
ests making Delaware the "queen" of U.S. corporate law also try to
6 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
7 Cf Bernhard Grossfeld, Loss of Distance: Global Corporate Actors and Global
Corporate Governance - Internet v. Geography, 34 INT'L LAW. 963 (2000).
8 Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations of Large Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669
(1993).
9 David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325 (1998).
10 David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bank-
ruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2000).
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catch the more or less subtle Delaware "influence" upon
reorganizations" .
II. DELAWARE
A. The Old Story12
The position of Delaware in corporate law needs little discussion.
Delaware derives nearly twenty percent (20 %) of her state's income
from franchise taxes and other corporate law fees. In addition, the cor-
porate harbor policy generates strong impulses for her economy as a
whole. Therefore, Delaware cannot afford to lose its corporate busi-
ness. Since Brandeis' seminal dissent in Louis K Ligget Co. v. Lee 3
and Cary's famous Reflections upon Delaware, 4 it has been discussed
whether Delaware stands for a "race to the bottom" or for a "race to the
top."' 5 Even today, both views are held with equal fervor. Lucian
Ayre Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell are rather skeptical, 6 whereas Wil-
ham T. Allen hails The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate
11 David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts
on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1998) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Judges].
12 The idea of the race-to-the-bottom represents the "the old story." See generally
Louis K Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541-80 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(discussing the states' need to protect public welfare from the practices of big
corporations through corporate taxation); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey
Corporate Chartermongering, 187.5-1929, 49 J. Eco.-. HIST. 677 (1989) (discussing
the rise and fall of New Jersey as chief "chartermonger" meaning the active
solicitation of corporate charters for the purpose of bolstering state revenue and its
replacement by Delaware).
13 288 U.S. at 541-80.
"4 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974) (discussing how Delaware courts in effect perpetuated the
state's management friendly corporations statutes, thus illustrating the "race-to-
the-bottom- theory). Contra Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of In-
determinacy in Corporate Law, 98 CoLumn. L. REv. 1908 (1998) (proposing that the
"race" led by Delaware is based not on friendliness either management or share-
holders but on indeterminacy, thus skewing the market for corporate law); Ralph
K Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (concluding that state corporate laws are indeed
shareholder friendly and that state regulation is, for the most part, preferable to
federal regulation, thus illustrating the "race-to-the-top" theory).
15 See ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENius OF AMERICAN CoRORATE L-w (1993) (com-
paring and contrasting the different theories of William L. Cary and Ralph K
Winter, Jr. on whether corporation law is a "race-to-the-bottom" or a "race-to-the-
top").
16 Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The
Race to Protect Managers from Takeover, 99 COLLUM. L. REX-. 1168 (1999).
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Law. 7 Robert Daines tells us that Delaware law increases stock mar-
ket prices' 8 - though, unfortunately, we do not know exactly whether
the market prices for securities reflect the intrinsic value of firms.
While the law and economics experts see the answer in market per-
formances, others criticize their reliance on the underlying concept of
efficiency 9 and question whether it is possible for markets to evaluate
corporate laws.2 0 There is no end to the debate in sight.2 '
B. The New Story
1. Rise to the Top
Delaware's position as a venue for reorganizations stems from
Bankruptcy Code § 1408, which allows debtors seeking debt relief to
file bankruptcy in the district of their domicile. "Domicile" has been
construed to mean the corporation's "state of incorporation. '22 The
rule is highly controversial, as it provides management with an oppor-
tunity for forum shopping and may thus be unfair to creditors.2 3 As
many large firms are incorporated in Delaware, the state has suc-
ceeded New York as corporate America's jurisdiction of choice for cor-
porate reorganizations.2 4
17 William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 70, 71 (2000) ("It is certainly the nation's and indeed the world's lead-
ing organization law for large scale business enterprises.").
18 Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. Fin. Econ. 525
(2001).
19 E.g. Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) (criticizing the old concept of efficiency, supported by
the law-and-economics approach, explaining a "new efficiency rationale").
20 E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Lim-
its on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1435 (1992);
Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 16; Lynn M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate
Legal Regimes? A Response to Professor Rasmussen, Thomas and Skeel, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 331 (2001) [hereinafter A Response].
21 See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Cor-
porate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1105 (2001). Contra Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's
Corporation-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a
Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's "Price Discrimination in
the Market for Corporate Law," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257 (2001).
22 David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bank-
ruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243 (2000) [hereinafter Lockups]; Robert K. Rasmussen
& Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent
Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000).
23 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 154 B.R 682, 686 (1993); MICHAEL J. CRAMES ET AL.,
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 88 (1998).
24 Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 967, 983 (1999).
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The run to Delaware started in the early 1990s and today Dela-
ware can boast that it is now by far the most popular venue for reorga-
nizations. It is important to note, however, that corporations rarely
have their headquarters or assets there. So called -brass plate" head-
quarters make Delaware the -home country." The "home" and thereby
the venue can be easily achieved at any time by a -domestication" pro-
cedure under the auspices of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act.2 5 Therefore, "large corporate debtors engage in rampant forum
shopping among bankruptcy courts in the United States."2 6 Over 60%
of reorganizations of large public corporations are filed in Delaware
bankruptcy court.2 7  Reorganization law has been largely "De-
lawarized,' not just as a matter of venue but also as a matter of
substance.2"
2. Controcersial Views
The two concepts of incorporation and reorganization thus op-
erate within an interrelated Delaware network. When incorporating
in Delaware the various shareholders join webs of interests that see
their advantage in Delaware and when seeking bankruptcy they join
webs that favor reorganization there. The connecting link over time is
the fact that in most cases the managers of the corporation, who re-
main in office as trustees, are rarely appointed.29 It is no surprise that
the old race to the bottom versus race to the top debate continues, this
time in regards to reorganizations. Robert K. Rasmussen, Randall S.
Thomas,3 ° and David A. Skeel, Jr.3 emphasize the speed, sophistica-
tion, and efficiency of Delaware. On the other side of the debate, Lynn
M. LoPucki and Sara D. Kalin condemn the "forum shopping" and crit-
icize the high re-filing rate (a practice that is not in line with Bank-
ruptcy Code § 1129(a)( 11)),32 thus showing Delaware's inefficiency in
bankruptcy reorganization. 33 The authors complain that Delaware
25 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate and Business Law, 35 U. RICH. L. RE-%. 499,
500 (2001).
26 See LoPucki, A Post-Universalist Approach, supra note 4, at 720.
2. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kahn, The Failure of Public Company Bankrupt-
cies in Delaware and Neu York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom, 54
VA','D. L. REv. 231, 235 (2001).
" Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Wither the Race? A Comment on
the Effects of the Delewarization of Corporate Reorganizations, .54 V.__N-D. L. REV.
283 (2001).
2 LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 27, at 233.
30 Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 28.
31 David A. Skeel, Jr., What's So Bad about Delaware?, 54 VA-N-D. L. RE,. 309
(2001).
32 LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 27, at 244.
33 Id. at 347.
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courts are not making informed decisions, but rather conforming to
what the parties present.3 4 Some commentators grumble that the run
is not for bankruptcy courts, but for judges that might have "cultivated
too cozy a relationship with debtors" ("judge shopping").3 1 Others indi-
cate their "displeasure with judges who might not be resistant to local
legal culture. 36 Creditors worry that corporate insiders are position-
ing themselves for a final windfall. But even creditors are not beyond
suspicion, as their most powerful supporters are expected to maneuver
aggressively for control of the official creditor's committee. But who is
most powerful before a Delaware court: foreign creditors or creditors
from abroad?
In the meantime, the choice of law discussion has gone beyond
Delaware. Some authors argue that a corporation should be able to
choose its preferred bankruptcy system in its corporate charter.37 The
charter choice would then bind creditors. Others prefer to include the
choice of bankruptcy venue in the lending agreement. 3' David A.
Skeel, Jr. goes so far as to question whether firms should be forced to
bring any reorganization petition in their state of incorporation. 3 9
C. Qualifications
The parallels between incorporation and reorganization should
not be overstated as crucial differences remain. Bankruptcy is regu-
lated by federal law, rather than by state law, because the bankruptcy
courts are a part of the federal district courts.4" The judges therefore,
are not appointed by Delaware constituencies. It is, however, contro-
versial to the extent Delaware's influence is diminished by federal in-
volvement. Bankruptcy courts often defer to the law of the state of
incorporation on such issues as fiduciary duties of management or big
shareholders and on matters concerning the internal affairs of the cor-
poration. It is even an open question whether federal intervention in
corporate affairs can avoid favoring Delaware.4 Skeel argues, "Corpo-
rate charter competition and Delaware's corporate culture exert bene-
34 Id. at 259. But see In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 154 B.R 682, 686 (1993).
35 Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22 at 1274; cf Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 24,
at 972.
36 LoPucki, A Response, supra note 20, at 354.
37 Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (1997).
38 Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L. J. 1807 (1998).
39 Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22, at 1275.
40 28 U.S.C. § 651, 1334.
41 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrel, Federal Intervention to Enhance Share-
holder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993 (2001); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001).
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ficial influence on Delaware bankruptcy practice."4 2 Certainly, larger
corporations tend to choose courts that they believe to be favorable to
reorganizations.' But favorable to whom? If Delaware law was not
advantageous to managers, many suspect that they would not flock to
the state.
D. Proposal for Reform
Section 1408 of the Bankruptcy Code has come under fire as a
result of the turn to Delaware.' Opponents wish to amend the section
in order to eliminate the place of incorporation as a venue option.' In
1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission adopted such a
proposal,' but so far that proposal has met with limited success.
III. UNDERLYING PREMISES
A Procedure
The controversy over Delaware goes right into the heart of the
public policy reasons for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. The fundamental philosophy underlying Chapter 11 is
highly favored by U.S. legal culture and tradition. That legal culture
and tradition is devoted to preserving the status quo and saving the
corporation, even at the cost of creditor interests.
Following a long practice in reorganization proceedings, the
debtor's management stays in control of the going concern. This gives
leverage to the established management and to some extent to share-
holder and worker interests. Though the reorganization plan should
aim "to maximize value for the general benefit of all creditors, the
debtor normally develops the plan for the reorganization. The debtor
has a period of exclusivity (roughly six months) that is often extended
by the court to give the debtor additional time to arrive at an agree-
ment. Typically, the plan provides for a reduction or elimination of
equity (often giving part or all of it to creditors or new investors), for
reduced debt (discharge) and delayed repayment. The bankruptcy
court will only confirm the plan for reorganization if there is a reason-
able likelihood that the plan's promise will be flulfilled. There must be
a sound expectation that the payments will be made as provided and
42 Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22, at 1270 n.96.
4 Lynn LoPucki & William Whiford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. RE-.
11 (1991).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1408.
4 Crames. supra note 23.
Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 11.
4' Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 284
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
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that the reorganized business will survive as an economically viable
entity (feasibility). Majority creditors can outvote dissenting minority
creditors.4' The court can force a class of creditors to accept a plan to
which they object if in the eyes of the court the plan is "fair and equita-
ble" and consistent with legal priorities.4 9
B. Discharges
The confirmation of the debtor's plan by the bankruptcy court
produces a complete discharge of all pre-confirmation debt except as
provided in the plan.5" This is the central feature in any reorganiza-
tion proceeding. The estate property vested in the debtor corporation
is free of all preexisting claims. It does not matter whether the credi-
tor filed a proof of the claim, accepted the plan or the plan listed the
debt.5 1 Any right to payment, which arises prior to bankruptcy, is a
pre-petition debt and is discharged, unless specifically excepted. The
discharge constitutes a bar to any action against the debtor; it works
like an injunction operating permanently to stay any attempt to hold
the debtor personally liable for discharged debts. 2 The corporation
gets a true "fresh start."
C. Feasibility
As a general rule, Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(11) requires a
"feasibility" study by the court to find out that the "[c]onfirmation of
the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor." The purpose of this
language is to prevent "visionary schemes."5 3 The corporation has to
show that "it has a fighting chance of surviving, even prospering, in
the economic community in which it operates."5 4 Therefore, "Valuation
is the most hotly contested and debated topic in the realm of corporate
bankruptcy proceedings." 5 This brings us into general questions of
48 INT'L STATEMENT OF U.S. BANKR. L. 59 (1997).
49 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2003) (dictating how a court may accomplish such an act).
50 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2003).
51 In re Chiles Power Supply Co., 264 B.R. 533, 542 (Bankr. D.W. Miss. 2001);
Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 654 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998).
52 River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 833 (4th Cir.
1994).
53 In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 651.
54 In re Abacus Broad. Corp., 154 B.R 682, 686 (1993).
55 Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing Corporations in
Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L. J. 83 (2001). Cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v.
203 North LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
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accounting cosmetics 5 6 and corporate valuation and thus into a field
that lawyers have shied away from far too long.57 It leaves wide room
for interested participants and their agents to maneuver.5 8 In an in-
ternational context, this gray zone (including foreign activities and for-
eign subsidiaries) is even larger, due to the widespread absence of
experience with global accounting and global valuations. The implica-
tions of "accounting mathematics"59 in different cultural contexts
("mathematics in context") are rarely discussed. 60
This becomes even more apparent when looking into the chal-
lenges of reorganization. 6 It is an "educated guess" (call it "specula-
tion") into a future that is dark by any definition. Determinations of
whether the reorganized debtor will have future net earnings and suf-
ficient cash flows to meet the restructured interests and to amortize
the restructured debts, and whether it can pay the projected dividends
must be made. The new capital structure, particularly the equity to
debt relationship should be sound and newly issued securities should
not be misleading in nature. Likewise, the general economic outlook,
the abilities of management and other intangibles that might be -in
the air" are of importance. A thorough valuation is a common neces-
sity, specifically when members of a corporate group seek to reorgan-
ize. If the assets of the various corporations had been commingled,
questions of fairness to the creditors of the individual members easily
62arise.
The focus is on "expectation of income" because the reorganiza-
tion value is the present worth of future anticipated earnings.6 3 Since
there is no single standard method to determine reorganization value,
the particular valuation approach for defining and capitalizing earn-
'6 Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
'Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CoRp. L.
141 (1997)
5' Bernhard Grossfeld, Lauvers and Accountants: A Semiotic Competition, 36
WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 167 (2001); see also John B. Attanasio, The Brave new World
of Multidisciplinary Practice, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (2000).
" Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 DEL. J. CoRP. L 37,
95 (1997)
9 Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48
Am. J. Comp. L. 261 (2000) [hereinafter Global Accounting].
6 Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Valuation: Geography and Semiotics, 55 SMU L.
REv. 197 (2002), forthcoming; Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyers Guide to Mod-
ern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 Iowa J. Corporate L.
457 (1996).
61 Eisenhofer & Reed, supra note 58, at 95.
62 Consol. Rock Prod. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
63 Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Fer=, Inc. v. Ander-
son, 390 U.S. 414, 442 n.20 (1968).
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ings has not yet been definitely defined. The most common methods
are the Comparable Company Analysis and the Discounted Cash Flow
Analysis. 4 These methods may support each other, as every analysis
needs additional information about comparables, to determine the cost
of debt, for instance, the beta coefficient.6 5 We also include data on
acquisition prices of comparable corporations. But what is compara-
ble? It goes without saying that "trustworthiness" of the experts and
of the courts are at the core of this business. This poses particular
problems for foreign participants, making the unevenness of informa-
tion is then obvious: "lemons" are difficult to discover from abroad.
D. Lockups
Another problem involves how the bankruptcy courts will han-
dle corporate lockups and which corporate law defines management's
fiduciary duty or defines the contractual analysis.6" Delaware seems to
be lockup "friendly" 7 as it often upholds even large lockups affecting
20% of the target's stock.6" Accordingly, lockups have become increas-
ingly important in this context. The term "lockups" includes any termi-
nation fee, stock options or options to purchase assets granted by a
target corporation to a particular bidder. They "float" somewhere be-
tween "bribe" and "deterrence." Target companies use lockups to en-
tice or to deter a bidder, friendly or hostile - but always according to
management's preference. It can either chill the bidding or favor a"white knight" (protecting management's policies and jobs).
A corporation undergoing reorganization is a kind of natural
target. Therefore, lockups play a prominent role in many cases as they
define, to a significant extent, the market value of the firm. Lockups
are difficult to evaluate; the burgeoning literature criticizes and
praises them in similar terms. Much depends on the circumstances,
on the time perspective, and on the prospective bidders.6 9 Their im-
pact on reorganization is even more difficult to evaluate;7 ° conse-
quently, there exists a remarkable degree of confusion. Sometimes
6 Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAW 419,
421 (1996); see Eisenhofer & Reed, supra note 58, at 112 (providing an overview of
the valuation methods).
65 See U.S. Inspect Inc. v. McGreevy, No. 160966, 2000 WL 33232337 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 27, 2000).
66 Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22, at 1264.
67 See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
8 Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22, at 1263.
69 See Marcel Kahan & Michel Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate
Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996); Paul L. Regan, Great Expectation? A Con-
tract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lockups, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1999).
70 Kermit Roosevelt, Understanding Lockups: Effects in Bankruptcy and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 93 (2000).
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they are quite negatively classified. In Calpine Corp. v. O'Brien Envi-
ronmental Energy, Inc., 71 the plaintiff argued that the lockup "did not
chill the bidding." The court answered:
This is a logical fallacy. While it is true that bid-
ding remained competitive in face of the uncertainty
whether such fees would be awarded, the bidding might
have been even more heated had the court definitively
ruled that Calpine was not entitled to a break-up fee or
expense earlier in the process.7 2
IV. GLOBAL REACH
A. Bankruptcy Universalism
The foregoing considerations are so important because of the
core concept of universalism in U.S. bankruptcy theory and practice: a
single court should have global control over the assets of a bankrupt
multinational corporation.
The aim of bankruptcy universalism "is to prevent the debtor's
estate from being picked to pieces by creditors," and to avoid "a chaotic
and uncontrollable scramble for the debtor's assets in a variety of un-
coordinated proceedings" in different countries.7 3
This tends to give domestic courts ultimate power over totally
foreign relations and transactions and enable them to export their so-
cial and economic policies through bankruptcy proceedings. This
might even happen even when all or most of the assets, like real estate
or shares in subsidiaries, are located abroad. As national laws van-
widely as to the appropriateness of bankruptcy actions, a severe clash
is often inevitable.
B. Location of Assets
The clash between national laws is programmed by § 101(23)
which asserts jurisdiction over a debtor's property "wherever located,"
thus claiming a worldwide jurisdiction over a debtor's assets.7 4 In ad-
dition, § 541(a)(1) defines the bankruptcy estate as comprising all of
the debtor's eligible property, "wherever located and by whoever held."
71 Calpine Corp. v. O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999).
72 Id. at 537.
,3 Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982): see
also Underwood v. Hilliard, 98 F.3d 956, 961 17th Cir. 1996); Andrew T. Guzman,
International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Uniuersalism, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2177
(2000).
71 In re Chiles Power Supply Co., 264 B.R. 533, 542 (Bankr. D.W. Miss. 2001); see
also L-r'L STATEMEN-T OF U.S. B*xKR. L. § 1HC) (Tentative Draft 1997) [hereinaf-
ter _-r'L STATEMENT].
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Section 1334(e) adds that in a bankruptcy case the district court "shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located." In
the courts' eyes Bankruptcy Code § 524(a) creates a "fiction" that the
property "regardless of any location" is legally located within the juris-
dictional boundaries ("constructive possession"; "custodia legis").
"This includes property outside... the United States."75 The courts ar-
gue that the efficacy of the bankruptcy proceedings depends on their
ability to control and marshal the assets of the debtor "wherever
located.76
These laws establish a global in rem jurisdiction for the pro-
ceeding over the debtor's property. Certainly, there is the often-men-
tioned presumption against the extraterritorial application of national
law.77  However, the presumption is rebuttable 7' and today's courts
hold that in bankruptcy proceedings Congress intended an extraterri-
torial application to property outside the territorial limits of the
United States.7 9 Occasionally, even a judge does not see any extrater-
ritorial implications: "[b]ankruptcy estate property is located within
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction."s ° Fiction = fact!
C. Enforcement of Discharge
The enforcement of discharges abroad is at the center stage of
global reorganizations. It appears when creditors try to exercise their
claims into the debtor's assets located abroad, be it in real estate or in
shares of foreign subsidiaries.
A prime example is In re Simon."' There, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether a foreign creditor is bound
by an individual debtor's discharge (Chapter 7) in a domestic bank-
ruptcy proceeding with regard to assets in Hong Kong.
The "money trail" began with a loan that the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (incorporated at the time in Hong
Kong) had extended to Odyssey International Holdings, Ltd. (incorpo-
75 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991
(9th Cir. 1998).76 Underwood, 98 F.3d at 961.
77 See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
78 In re Chiles Power Supply Co., 264 B.R. at 542.
79 In re Simon, 93 F.3d at 996; In re Chiles Power Supply Co., 264 B.R. at 542;
Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998);
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 287
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
'0 In re Simon, 93 F.3d at 1000.
81 In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 991; cf. Charles D. Booth & Philip St. J. Smart, The
New Avoidance Powers under Hong Kong Insolvency Law: A Move From Territori-
ality to Extraterritoriality, 34 INT'L. LAW. 255 (2000).
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rated in the British Virgin Islands). The defendant Simon was Odys-
sey's major shareholder. Simon lived in and operated the company
from Hong Kong. He personally guaranteed the loan and agreed that
it should be "construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of Hong Kong" 2 and that the courts in Hong
Kong should have jurisdiction "over all disputes arising under the
guaranty." 3 When Simon could not satisfy the loan in due course he
fled (like in Homer's "Odyssey") to California and filed for personal
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. He listed
the guaranty to the bank on account of the loan as an obligation or
liability.
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation filed a proof of
claim in the bankruptcy court on its behalf in a separate bank loan. It
did not file a proof of claim for Simon's guaranty, nor did it object to
the discharge of the debts. The bankruptcy court then granted Simon
a discharge of all debts. Pursuant to § 524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code the court issued the following injunction: "All creditors whose
debt are discharged by this order... are enjoined from instituting or
continuing any act to collect such debts as personal liabilities of the
above-named debtor."'
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation then sought a
declaratory judgment that the discharge did not apply to enjoin the
bank from enforcing the Simon guarantee in Hong Kong and that the
bank would not be subject to sanctions in the United States if it chose
to commence collection proceedings in Hong Kong. The bankruptcy
court dismissed and noted that the discharge injunction was not di-
rectly enforceable in Hong Kong. It was enforceable, however, in the
United States via the imposition of sanctions followed by appropriate
collection proceeding against the bank's property located in the United
States.8 5 The court of appeals affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision.
The case indicates how the concept of extraterritoriality and of
personal jurisdiction has changed recently. In 1997, the Transna-
tional Insolvency Project stated, "[i]f the Discharge is granted by the
United States as primary jurisdiction, it is highly likely that the
United States would assert jurisdiction and intend that its Discharge
would be honored elsewhere, but there is no substantial authority on
point." 8 6
This view has changed dramatically.
52 In re Simon 153 F.3d at 994.
-3 Id.
E4 Id.
85 Id. at 995.
Lr'L STATEMIET,-r, supra note 74, at 120.
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V. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. General Aspects
Today, it seems clear that the United States does not sanction
a foreign creditor not subject to U.S. jurisdiction when he exercises his
rights abroad. This might then induce the bankruptcy court to permit
other creditors to join the hunt for the assets abroad. 7 Even if the
creditor subsequently files a claim, the claim will not have a retroac-
tive effect."8
The automatic stay, however, can be enforced by an injunction
if the U.S. court has personal (in personam) jurisdiction over the credi-
tor. 9 In this way, when the creditor is a U.S. citizen, he may not exer-
cise individual rights abroad without the permission of the bankruptcy
court. Should the creditor act without the court's permission then
sanctions may be levied. The creditor must accept the debtor's dis-
charge.9 ° The issue is different with foreign citizens. In cases of for-
eign citizens, personal jurisdiction will only be affirmed when the
foreign citizen has consented to the U.S. proceeding9 1 or is subject to
U.S. jurisdiction on other grounds.92 Should jurisdiction be affirmed,
then the foreign citizen is restrained from taking actions in violation of
the automatic stay against the debtor's assets wherever located - at
home or abroad.9 3
A leading example is In re Nakasch9" where the court held that
a foreign receiver, subject to personal jurisdiction of a U.S. court, vio-
lated the automatic stay by instituting voluntary insolvency proceed-
ings against a debtor abroad. There was some discussion whether this
rule would extend to any "case" filed in the U.S. even when another
87 In re McLean Industries, Inc., 74 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); cf. Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEx. INT'L L. J. 27 (1998).
88 INT'L STATEMENT, supra note 74, at 112; see also Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.,
517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
89 Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 515; Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
90 Underwood v. Hilliard, 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996); In re McTague, 198
B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
91 Detroit Trust Co. v. Campbell River Timber Co., 98 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1938).
92 In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 768; Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227
B.R. 638, 654 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998).
9' See Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991
(9th Cir. 1998); INT'L STATEMENT, supra note 74, at 111; Jeremy V. Richards, The
Long Arm of Canadian Insolvency Law and a Tale of Three Jurisdictions, 17 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 12 (1998) ( international complications).
94 190 B.R. at 767.
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country has primary jurisdiction, "but there is no authority for that
result."9 5
The chances for foreign creditors to escape are slim. Bank-
ruptcy courts follow the "global" pattern of in rem jurisdiction when
they discuss personal (in personam) jurisdiction. They have developed
an "uncanny propensity" to exercise worldwide jurisdiction based on
consent or on other grounds. Their leading idea is that allowing a for-
eign creditor to seize property of the bankruptcy estate located outside
the territorial confines of the United States would affect the "very"
ability of the court to fairly distribute the assets.9 6
It is. therefore decisive to know what constitutes "consent" and
"jurisdiction."
B. Consent
It is not entirely clear what activity might constitute consent to
jurisdiction. It is, however, generally accepted that filing a claim in
the proceeding is sufficient for consent regarding this claim.9 7 The
question, however, is whether participation with one claim constitutes
comprehensive consent for all others.
1. Surrender
This problem of comprehensive consent was crucial to In re Si-
mon.9" There, the court bypassed the "block" of personal jurisdiction
by avoiding to "squarely address that question because Hong Kong
-Shanghai fully participated in the Simon bankruptcy, thus surren-
dering to United States jurisdiction."9 9 However, the matter was more
complicated than these words indicate.
The creditor had offered a proof of claim for another bank loan,
but had not filed a proof of claim for the loan secured by the guaranty
nor for the guarantor. Therefore, the Bank disputed an extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction effect. The court did not accept that view. It con-
cluded "[flurther, as the district court noted, Langenkamp t. Culp ...
suggests that filing a proof of claim to any debt is sufficient to subject a
creditor to the general jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court."' °
95 LNT'L STATEMENT, supra note 74, at 140 n.235; cf. Evan D. Flaschen, et al., For-
eign Representation in U.S. Chapter 11 Cases: Filling the Void in the Law of Mul-
tinational Insolvencies, 17 Co-,N-. J. INT'L L. 3 (2001).
' Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 287
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
17 See Langenkamp v. Culp., 498 U.S. 42, 45 (1990); In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 207
B.R. at 286; INT'L STATEMENT, supra note 74, at 111-12, 140 n. 237.
98 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
9 Id. at 997.
(o Id.
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The court also noted that the bank did not use other opportuni-
ties to assert its position in the bankruptcy court. The guarantor had
listed the guaranty on his bankruptcy schedules without objection by
the bank. The bank also made no objection to the discharge of the
guarantor's debt: "by acceding to bankruptcy court jurisdiction so that
it might recover a portion of the money it was owed, Hong Kong-
Shanghai forfeited any right it had to claim that the court lacked the
power to enjoin Hong Kong-Shanghai from commencing a post-bank-
ruptcy collection proceeding against the debtor."' ° '
2. Circumvention
Once established by consent, jurisdiction cannot be circum-
vented by later activities. The In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. German cred-
itor "Altonia" and the Singapore creditor "Andrea" had claims against
a U.S. corporation "Lykes." "Andrea" had filed a proof of claim in the
respective Chapter 11 proceeding in Florida. Five days after the be-
ginning of the proceeding both creditors assigned their claims to the
German "Hanseatic" that seemed to have been created a few days after
the assignment. The assignment documents required confidentiality
- particularly toward "Lykes." "Hanseatic" then procured the arrest
of one of Lykes' ships in a court in Belgium in order to compel payment
of the claims "purportedly" assigned to it.' °2 Subsequently Hanseatic
attempted to compel arbitration of its claims in the United Kingdom.
The court concluded: "It is not unreasonable to infer that Hanseatic
was created and the claims assigned to Hanseatic to avoid the auto-
matic stay, and to that extent, violate the automatic stay and this
Court's ... Stay Order."' 0 3
C. Other Grounds for Jurisdiction
The majority in the Hong Kong and Shanghai case, In re Si-
mon, saw a more difficult jurisdictional problem "if the creditor was
not a party to the United States bankruptcy proceedings.""0 4 The pre-
sent trend, however, is to overcome that hurdle.
1. In re Chiles Power Supply Co. 0 5
This case stands for the tendency to considerably broaden the
traditional concept of personal jurisdiction. It centered around a dis-
charge that was secured by the announcement of a permanent chan-
neling injunction (Bankruptcy Code § 105) against all released claims.
101 Id.
102 In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 207 B.R. at 285.
103 Id.
104 In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 996-97.
105 264 B.R. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001).
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It should prevent "a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble for the debtor's
assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts."1°
The Canadian creditors sought discovery from the debtor through a
Canadian court. The creditors had notice of the U.S. bankruptcy pro-
ceeding but did not participate in any way. The court was of opinion
that their actions in Canada satisfied the jurisdictional minimum con-
tact requirements. arguing that the creditors' action in a foreign court"poses a direct threat to the bankruptcy estate if it threatens to deplete
the estate."10 7
The court listed three actions that may satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement: 0 8 ( 1) transacting business in the United
States; (2) doing an act in the United States; (3) having an effect in the
United States by an act done elsewhere."" 9 The court relied on the
third action as the creditor had sought discovery from a debtor in a
Canadian court:
As discussed above the Defendants' actions
against Heatway and the Carriers in the Canadian Liti-
gation, without regard to this Court's Order of Confirma-
tion containing a release of all claims against the
Carriers, threatens to torpedo a confirmed Chapter 11
Plan... As such the Defendants' actions in Canada not
only satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, but
have a profound effect in the United States where the
estate res is located. I find, therefore, that this Court has
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants, and that their
actions are in violation of the automatic stay and the
channeling injunction." 0
2. In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co."'
The court in In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. used the criteria deline-
ated in In re Chiles Power Supply Co. to the fullest extent. The court
asserted jurisdiction over a German firm, -Altonia," on the ground that
the firm had transacted business in the United States by entering into
a charter with Lykes, "a U.S. citizen," for the "foreign commerce of the
United States with other citizens of the United States."" 2 Among
other factors, the court mentioned that the vessel had to be delivered
106 Id. at 540 (quoting Underwood v. Hilliard, 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996)).
107 Id. at 541.
1O" Id. at 543.
109 Id. (citing Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207
B.R. 282, 286 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)).
110 Id. at 543-44.
'11 207 B.R. 282 tBankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
112 Id. at 286.
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and redelivered in New York and that all bills of lading under the
charter were subject to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act" 3 of the
United States. However, the application of these general standards to
discharges is not clear. Jurisdiction over the Singapore firm, "An-
drea," was based on "consent," as the firm had "voluntarily filed its
proof of claim"1 4 in the present reorganization, and thus "purposefully
submitted itself to this Court's jurisdiction.""'
With regard to "Hanseatic," the court concluded: "nothing in
the record warrants the conclusion that Hanseatic is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of this Court." The court continued, asserting
that it has "jurisdiction over all property of the estate where so ever
located", even in Belgium." 6 Consequently, the court entered an in-
junction against "Hanseatic," arguing that the firm's actions were in
willful violation of the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the au-
tomatic stay. The effects doctrine gave the more general basis:
Hanseatic has taken an action that it clearly
knew or reasonably should have foreseen would have an
effect in the United States. The clear intent of the
seizure was to compel payment by a Chapter 11 debtor of
the assigned claims. The actions clearly have effects in
the United States inasmuch as they disrupt the Debtor's
business with customers around the globe and also dis-
rupt this Court's administration of this estate. The ac-
tion also clearly affects the commerce of the United
States and its citizens. Hanseatic knew or reasonably
should have known that its conduct in seizing the M/V
STELLA LYKES would have an effect in the United
States. Consequently, this Court finds that the exercise
of jurisdiction over Hanseatic does not violate traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 7
D. Comity
Bankruptcy courts may be required by international comity "to
abstain from exercising [their personal] jurisdiction where conflicts ex-
ist with foreign law."'' Comity, as "the mutual respect of sover-
eigns,"" 9 is a matter of practice, convenience, and expediency "rather
113 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 et seq. (2000).
114 Id. at 284.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 287.
117 Id. at 288.
118 Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998).
"' Underwood v. Hilliard, 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996).
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than law."' 2 ° In re Simon argued that this principle of comity required
"deference to the courts of Hong Kong."1 2 ' The Bank argued that inter-
national bankruptcy was "territorial" in nature and that courts in each
national jurisdiction are responsible for seizing and controlling assets
within their geographic reach.' 2 2 The debtor argued a "universalist"
philosophy, with one transnational proceeding governing the adminis-
tration of assets worldwide. 2 3
The court, however, preferred a flexible approach dependent
upon the circumstances in the particular case. Preference should be
given to the country where the primary insolvency proceeding is lo-
cated. In cases of multiple proceedings the courts will defer to where
the center of gravity is, if it can be ascertained. As there was no com-
peting bankruptcy proceeding going on in Hong Kong, the court saw no
conflict between Hong Kong and U.S. laws. Following Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California,'2 4 the court concluded that comity is limited to
cases in which "'there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law.' '125 Other courts follow this precedent as well.' 26 They
will, for instance, take into consideration whether foreign "penalty
payments" will be forfeited. 127
E. Act of State
The comity aspect may gain strength through the act of state
doctrine. 23 The act of state doctrine is implicated when a foreign re-
ceiver seeking to enforce a claim has a government status abroad (e.g.
representing the Ministry of Justice). The In re Nakash court could
not find "such acts to be those which a sovereign would undertake in
fulfilling its duty to supervise bankruptcies. Rather, they are acts sim-
ilar to those private creditors would undertake in a commercial
role."' 2 9 The court also mentioned that the receiver's personal liability
for breach of his duties "is not consistent with sovereignty." 3 ° Such
120 See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S., 482 U.S. 522, 543
(1987).121 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991
(9th Cir. 1998).
122 id.
123 Id.
124 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
125 Id. at 797.
126 See In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 991; Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763,
770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).127 Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 657 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998).
's Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417 (1964).
1 In re Nakesh, 190 B.R. at 769.130 Id. at 770.
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conflicts would not rise to the level of "imperiling relations between
governments" or "embarrassing the U.S. executive branch in its con-
duct of foreign relations.''
VI. CRITICAL VIEWS
The present situation leaves room for discussion with regard to
some of the underlying assumptions.
A. Geography
1. Order of Orders
If we take for granted that matters of legal sovereignty first
have to do with location, 132 then assets located abroad are closer to the
most affected territorial legal orders. Therefore, geography is the ba-
sis of all human ordering and of all Law. Also, if sovereignty means
first physical control over assets and over how they are disposed of,
then again the countries of location are closer to the issue. In Watkins
v. Holman the Supreme Court stated: "[a]nd no principle is better es-
tablished that the disposition of real estate, whether by deed, descent
or by any other mode, must be governed by the law of the State where
the land is situated."133
"It is well settled that where rights to real property are in is-
sue, the law of the situs of the property controls."1 34 This is the result
of fundamental and universal interests analysis. Therefore, regulating
the fate of assets located in another state is not to be taken lightly.
2. Cross-border Fictions
Cross-border fictions seems to be a clear concept among sister
states and even more among sovereign states. Courts, however, do not
have great regard for the territory of a foreign state. International and
domestic cases have equal footing. For instance, the In re Simon credi-
tor was in Hong Kong; Odyssey International Holding Ltd, though in-
corporated in the Virgin Islands, maintained offices and was operated
in Hong Kong; and the debtor of the guaranty lived in Hong Kong.1 3 5
The collection action commenced in Hong Kong against real estate
131 Id.
132 See Grossfeld, Global Accounting, supra note 59; Bernhard Grossfeld, Geogra-
phy and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510 (1984).
133 Watkins v. Holman's Lessee, 41 U.S. 25, 57 (1842).
134 El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zink Co., 575 F.Supp. 1513, 1517 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(citing Carrolton Assoc. v. Abrams, 293 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968)).
135 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991
(9th Cir. 1998).
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property located there."3 6 It would not be farfetched to assume that
given all these circumstances the -fiction of [U.S. location] should yield
to the totality of [Hong Kong] contacts." x3 7
The court won over reality by referring to the words "construc-
tive possession- and "custodia legis." The first term is taken from
Katchen v. Landy138 , where there was no international background.' 3 9
The second term was used in Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n u.
Co Petro Marketing Group' likewise without an international
setting.
This is not simply a matter of transferring language within an
international frame as fictions change their nature when going across
borders. 4 ' Bank of Augusta v. Earl'4 2 told us long ago with regard to
a corporation as an "artificial" being that a fiction "exists only in con-
templation of law, and by force of law; and where that law ceases to
operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no exis-
tence."' 4 3 Do U.S. fictions exist abroad where they are not protected
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause"' as they are within the United
States? The Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause "substituted
a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically al-
tered the status of the States as independent sovereigns.""' s Federal
law, such as the Bankruptcy Code, leads to the same result. According
to the Nottebohm case of the International Court of Justice, "fictions"
cannot be used unilaterally to govern the relation between sovereign
states. 14 6
3. Strength of Precedents
As to the inclusion of "property outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States- the Stegeman 14 7 court came to a different
conclusion from Nottebohm. However, the difference in the factual
136 Id.
137 Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 CalApp.2d 399, 403 (1961).
138 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966).
's See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1939)
140 700 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1983).
141 Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a
Legal Fiction, 114 H-.Rv. L. REx. 1745. 1750 (2001).
142 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839).
14 See also Case 81/87, Regina v. H.M. Treasury & Comm'r of Inland Revenue ex
parte Daily Mail & Gen. Trust, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [19881 3 C.M.L.R. 713, 725
(1988).
144 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
145 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 t 1998) (quoting from Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948)).
146 The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
147 425 F.2d 984, 986 (1970).
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background is dramatic. In Stegeman v. U.S. the situation was re-
versed from Nottebohm: the debtor had "fraudulently transferred prop-
erty from the District of Oregon to Canada.' 14 ' The language was
directed against "a large immunity for fraud as easily committed by
citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home."' 4 9 Cir-
cumvention and concealment were the issues. The In re Simon debtor,
however, disappeared from Hong Kong: "[iinstead, facing personal
debts of over 200 million, he traveled to the United States and filed a
personal bankruptcy" ° - leaving the assets behind.
Underwood v. Hilliard'5 also does not fully support the court's
view. There the emphasis was that "the efficacy of the bankruptcy
proceedings depends on the court's ability to control and marshal the
assets of a debtor wherever located (see sect. 541 (a))."1 52 National
fictions do not give such control over assets abroad.
B. Domestic v. Extraterritorial Effects
The cases In re Chiles Power Supply Co."' and In re Lykes'14
tell another strange lesson. They change the traditional concept of do-
mestic effects and of extraterritoriality.
1. "Domestic Globality"
Due to the fictitious location of assets in the United States, ac-
tivities abroad that conflict with an extraterritorial fiction were held to
have domestic effects in the United States. The whole world thus be-
comes globally "domestic;" fiction prevails over fact. Effects are no
longer seen as being physical in nature. It is enough that they conflict
somewhere in the world with a legal network that pretends globality.
Extraterritorial reach has domestic effects. It would be more honest
than that which the In re Simon dissent had proposed: there is no
question of extraterritoriality, because for reorganizations purposes all
matters are domestic as this fiction 'domesticates' them there!155
2. Loss of Focus
In the two cases just mentioned, In re Chiles Power Supply Co.
and In re Lykes, the terms "domestic" and "extraterritorial" lose their
148 Id. at 985.
149 Id. at 986.
150 Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
994 (9th Cir. 1998).
15' 98 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 1996).
152 Id. at 961.
153 264 B.R. 533, 542 (Bankr. D.W. Miss. 2001).
154 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
155 In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 1000.
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focus. If we look at it closer, we see immediately that "domestic," in
terms of time, applies first to Canada and Belgium and then to the
United States. Similarly, the term "extraterritorial" becomes ambigu-
ous. Both terms backfire toward each other, constantly changing be-
tween domestic and extraterritorial effects. The distinctions in
geography are made senseless through verbal fictions.
But the basic facts remain unchanged: the primary territorial
and social effects are where the assets are located; the effects outside
this location are secondary. They have to cross a nonphysical bridge
built unilaterally cross-border into Canadian or Belgian territory. Do-
mestic turns into extraterritorial and vice versa due to the power of
words'
C. Comitv
The trouble is that the abstract term "comity," as taken from
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,' seems to have been ap-
plied to different facts and circumstances. In Hartford Fire Insurance,
English reinsurance companies had "conspired in violation of sect. 1
Sherman Act to restrict the terms of coverage of commercial general
liability... insurance available in the United States."' 5 7 The Hartford
Fire Insurance defendants tried to take value out of the United States.
In Hong Kong & Shanghai and similar cases, the issue was whether
the "fiction of possession" over real estate outside the United States
could be turned into "something" more real, channeling the monetary
value of the assets to participants in a U.S. proceeding - a proceeding
tainted by U.S. interests. 5 ' In Sterling Drug Incorporated v. Bayer
AG 5 9 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came closer to the
second view. It held that Hartford Fire Insurance was "not automati-
cally transferable to the trademark context:"' 6 0
It is one thing for the British reinsurers in Hart-
ford Fire to be barred under United States law from boy-
cotting activity that they might be free to engage in
without violating British law. But it is quite a different
thing for the holder of rights in a mark under German
law to be ordered by a United States court to refrain
from uses of that mark protected by German law.'
The court also quoted from the Restatement of Law of Unfair Competi-
tion: "[in establishing the parameters of injunctive relief in the case of
'56 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
157 Id. at 770.
In re Simon, 153 F.3d at 991.
159 Sterling Drug Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
160 Id. at 746.
161 Id. at 747.
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lawful concurrent users, a court must take account of the realities of
the market place."' 6 2
D. Full Faith and Credit Clause16 3-Analogy
When bankruptcy courts inhibit the execution of claims in for-
eign real estate they control the disposition of part of the foreign terri-
tory and effectively prevent the exertion of foreign legal rules. There
seems to be little doubt that, in the first place, it is the foreign coun-
try's matter to enforce a domestic creditor's claim against a domestic
piece of land. This comes close to the general territorial principle of
execution that the U.S. Supreme Court only recently affirmed in Baker
v. Gen. Motors Co.:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean
that States must adopt the practices of other States re-
garding the time, manner, and mechanisms for enforcing
judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel with
the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such
measures remain subject to the evenhanded control of fo-
rum law. 1 6 4
The Court referred to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
"the local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judg-
ment of another state is enforced.' '1 65
Given these views, injunctions against foreign creditors, which pro-
hibit enforcement of their claims against assets abroad, will remain
controversial. They put the local assets under a foreign country's con-
trol, thus bringing its monetary value into foreign coffers.
E. Creditors' Interests
1. Domestic Enforcement Chances
From the foreign creditors' point of view foreign states cannot
be treated as being on the same level with sister states. Sister state
cases "live" under the common umbrella of Federal bankruptcy law
whereas international cases occur under different national bankruptcy
laws with different rules. This causes a lot of concern: if creditors are
prevented from attachments in their home countries, somebody else
clever enough not to be regarded as bound by U.S. law or not subject to
U.S. sanctions, may take advantage of it. As a practical result, credi-
162 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 3, 1991)).
163 U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1.
164 Baker v. Gen. Motors Co., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998).
165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 99 (1969).
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tors have to leave the assets in which they put their trust and which
reflect local interest rates to a wide range of other creditors which the
bankruptcy court cannot prevent from pursuing their interest.
This leads us to the question, whether reorganizations can be
argued without regard to the assumptions of where the debtor's assets
are located. Cole v. Cunningham'66 told us long ago, that injunctions
against an out of state attachment "evade" the laws of the proper juris-
diction (defined by "domicile" in that case). The In re Simon bank had
its domicile in Hong Kong where the debtor had been domiciled and
the assets were located when he gave the guaranty. 167 The loan was
given on the reasonable expectation that the risk could be evaluated
under the debtor's conditions in Hong Kong. There were no "foreign
risks" in the contemplation of the parties. Very probably this affected
the interest rate for the loan, (no "foreign risks - factor" added) and
thereby the price of the transaction. All of a sudden the security be-
came a "foreign" asset through the debtor's unilateral action. By "trav-
eling" to the United States the debtor effectively "expropriated" the
domestic creditor to an unpredictable extent. Should courts use fic-
tions to protect such behavior?
2. Change of Risks
The loss of chances to enforce claims domestically might even
considerably change positions of substantive law. That starts with
currency fluctuations and with possibly different priorities for the
creditor 6 " and might burden him with risks that were not within the
expectation of the parties when they agreed on the price for the debt.
The creditor might have to share the debtor's estate with creditors
that would have had no chances to share with him under domestic
bankruptcy rules. Examples include creditors from punitive damage
claims, 69 from more liberal or newly invented "piercing the corporate
veil rules,"7 ° or from attorneys' contingency fees. We can also take for
granted that the creditor has much less influence over foreign proceed-
ings than over a domestic proceeding.
166 See 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
' Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
994 (9th Cir. 1998).
168 See discussion infra Part V.G.
169 Steven Garber, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency: A Problem
Without a Solution, 52 ST.A-,. L. REv. 1809 (2000).'-O Cf U.S. v. Bestfood, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe,
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L.
RE-,. 127 (1999); Damien Considine, The Real Barriers to Regulation of Corporate
Groups, 3 AsIA PAC. L. REV. 37 (1994); Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corpora-
tions and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory - Chinese Private
Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1599 (2000).
20041
114 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 4:1
Bankruptcy venues are more than just a matter of procedure.
These venues are risk relevant - as the high Delaware refiling rate
clearly indicates - and they exert a deep impact on issues of substan-
tial law. Therefore they are also price relevant and will become an
important factor when "rating" a corporation's credit standing for cred-
itors from abroad.
F. Comprehensive Surrender
This leads us into similar doubts with regard to the compre-
hensive "surrender" concept. As venue is risk and price relevant, cred-
itors might have sound reasons not to be too "liberal" towards foreign
bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the authorities normally re-
ferred to for the "lump-surrender" approach are weak. Langenkamp v.
Culp differs on the facts, "[r]espondents filed claims against the bank-
ruptcy estate, thereby bringing themselves within the equitable juris-
diction of the [b]ankruptcy [ciourt. Consequently they were not
entitled to a jury-trial on the trustee's performance action."1 7 ' Again,
there was no international implication.
There may also be difficulties with the concept of surrender if
the creditor and debtor expressly agree on enforcement in a particular
country and exclude others. Paragraph 15 of the In re Simon debtor's
guaranty provided that, it should be "construed and determined under
and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of Hong Kong."172
Such a clause could be interpreted as excluding any other forum. Is
this meaningless, given the fact that the debtor has wide opportunities
to choose the bankruptcy venue?
G. Public Interest (Political Economy)
But there is also a strong public interest involved when an in-
junction from abroad limits the free disposition of domestic assets.
The power to regulate what assets, in particular real estate and corpo-
rate shares, can be freely disposed of is the core question of every eco-
nomic balance and is a central issue of sovereign regulatory power. An
injunction by a foreign court is a harsh interference by that sovereign
into the domestic flow of assets and privilege to decide who should ac-
quire them. Injunctions from abroad put these assets under foreign
control and use the foreign creditor as a private instrument for imple-
menting foreign public policy goals whose "credibility" is often difficult
to evaluate.
Another concern is that all unilaterally imposed cross-border
movements of valuable assets have an important characteristic: their
171 Id. at 45.
172 153 F.3d at 991.
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monetary value is largely "sipped away" from the domestic economic
circle and transferred into the economic circle of another country -
often never to return. This again distinguishes international transfers
from sister state transfers within the United States. In the latter case
the value of the assets remains within the U.S. economy.
VII. FOREIGN REACTIONS
A. Global Implications
So far, Delaware and reorganization are mainly subjects for
discussions within the United States. Critiques of Delaware reorgani-
zation law are of little practical consequences as they do not affect the
validity of Delaware incorporations or reorganizations within the
United States. For incorporations entities, the Constitution's Full
Faith and Credit Clause1 73 forms a protective shield, as it provides for
the recognition of most judicial proceedings of every State of the
Union.1 74 It -substituted a command for the earlier principles of com-
ity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent
sovereigns."1 7 5 We could also explain it as creating a taboo to ques-
tioning the basis for "full faith" and the intrinsic "fairness" of the pro-
cedure. For reorganizations the result is the same because bankruptcy
law is federal law and, therefore, applicable everywhere in the United
States.
These defensive taboos cannot be used against foreign states.
Giving the critical arguments raised within the United States, Dela-
ware has a remaining credibility problem. As long as foreign states
are not bound by comity or international treaty obligations, they will
ask whether they may grant full faith and credit (call it -comity" in
trans-border cases) to Delaware reorganizations. The controversial
status of Delaware within the United States causes the classic "lem-
ons" story outside the United States. 176 States have learned from ex-
perience that other states are both willing and able (call it
"diplomacy") to mask an unflattering picture with verbal cosmetics
and to "get a facelift" (making "face to face" recognition even more dif-ficult). 17 7 The term "imperfect information and credible communica-
173 U.S. CONST. art. lV, § 1.
174 Baker v. Gen. Motors Co., 522 U.S. 222 (1998); see Mark Strasser, Baker and
Some Recipients for Disaster: On DOMA. Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and
Credit Jurisprudence, 64 BROOK L. REv. 307 (1998).
175 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
176 George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcoN. 488 (1970).
177 Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for
"Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CoRP. L.
141, 142 (1997).
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tion"178 describes the issue perfectly - or should we talk of the "lemon"
approach in international relations? Whatever the name, we have to
analyze the communication game between a sender and a receiver
with misaligned incentives and, therefore, a possible lack of equilib-
rium in global reorganizations.
B. Territory v. Fiction "Nottebohm"
The traditional skepticism against trans-border effects of fic-
tions will be the first line of defense. This skepticism, as expressed in
Bank of Augusta, is supported by the Nottebohm case 1 79 and shared in
other jurisdictions. A famous example is the language of the European
Court of Justice in the Daily Mail & Gen. Trust case:
In that regard it should be borne in mind that,
unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the
law and, in the present state of Community law, crea-
tures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the va-
rying national legislation which determines their
incorporation and functioning.8 °
Here the purpose was to secure national control over domestic corpora-
tions. We may take for granted that the sentiment is even stronger,
when fictions are used to make domestic real estate a foreign asset.
What counts are not fictions but effects. Are fictions "genuine links"
for real estate?' 8 ' Probably not.
C. Economic Effects - "Fruehauf'
The international test is still the Fruehauf case that pitched
France against the United States." 2 The case turned around the ex-
traterritorial effects of the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act' 8 3 that
caused defensive actions by the French courts' - with international
applause.'S5 Here, the detrimental effects on the foreign economy and
on its concept of distribution of risk are most easily recognizable when
178 See Fischer & Stocken, supra note 1.
179 The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
180 Case 81187, Regina v. H.M. Treasury & Comm'r of Inland Revenue ex parte
Daily Mail & Gen. Trust, 1988 E.C.R. 5483, [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 713, 725 (1988).
1 See The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (discussing
what constitutes a real link between the naturalized person and the naturalizing
nation).
182 Societe Fruehaf-France v. Massardy, CA Paris, 14e ch., May 22, 1965, J.C.P.
1965, II, 14247 (France), 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966).
183 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (2004).
184 RECUEIL DALLOZ-SIREY, JURISPRUDENCE 147 (1968).
.85 See Andrea Bianchi, Extraterritoriality and Export Controls, 35 GER. Y. INT'L
L. 365 (1992); William Laurence Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy
GLOBAL CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
the foreign creditor enforces a secured debt in a foreign asset serving
as security. The order of priority as the basis for the interests charged
might be quite different under U.S. bankruptcy rules."8 6 Also, receiv-
ing shares in a Delaware corporation might not be regarded by foreign
creditors as a proper investment. An enforced reliance on Delaware's
internal affairs rules might bring foreigners into a situation that they
are unable to control at reasonable costs.
D. Credible Commitment
Negative foreign reactions might also be driven by a rising dis-
trust in U.S. courts. This starts with skepticism toward local influ-
ences on U.S. judges. Popular election contests sponsored by
lawyers l1 7 are a constant matter of concern for foreign claimants and
defendants.' The following words of Judge Richard Neely from the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals are often quoted:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth
from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs,
I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced
when I give someone else's money away, but so is my job
security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families,
and their friends will reelect me.' 8 9
And even where judges are appointed (as in federal courts)
such legal "melodies" are remembered when U.S. authors allude to
"judge shopping" 9° or indicate their displeasure with judges who
might not be resistant to local legal culture.' 9 '
E. Friendly "Fire"?
This cross-border atmospheric environment might be impor-
tant though "friendly fire" can also be harmful. But even below the
level of "fire," all individual injunctions to secure the global reach of
Delaware reorganizations might be futile, if the foreign state is not
Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Mas-
sardy, 83 HARv. L. REv. 579 (1970).
18" Cf The Bank of New York & JCPL Leasing Corp. v. Treco (In re Treco), 240
F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing the reverse situation).
117 Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of
Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 157 (1999).
1s8 Rolf A. Schuetze, Richterwahlsponsoring: Uberlegungen zur Ordre Public-
Widrigkeit von Urteilen US-Amerikanischer Staatsgerichte, 100 ZErrscHnirFT FUER
VERGLEICHENDE REcHTswIssENscHAFr 464 (2001).189 RIcHARD NEELY, THi PRODUCT LIABnry MESS 4 (1988).
"9 See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 24, at 972; Skeel, Lockups, supra note 22
at 1274.
'91 See LoPucki, A Response, supra note 20, at 354.
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willing to go along with it or if it is not offering a willingness not to
interfere. But the motivation to grant international comity needs con-
stant "watering" and should not be taken for granted. Otherwise, anti-
injunctions' 9 2 and claw back statutes 9 ' hang in the air and might
lead to unexpected reactions. Remember "Fruehauf'!'
VIII. "REVERSE SITUATION"-TEST
To test the inherent cross-border fairness of the U.S. concept of
comity in bankruptcy proceedings it is advisable to discuss the issue in
a reverse situation. How would U.S. courts react in the following situ-
ation: a foreign state - similar in size and in reputation to Delaware
and with reorganization proceedings similar to the U.S. law'9 5 - would
enjoin U.S. creditors (not parties to the foreign proceeding) from en-
forcing their claims against U.S. debtors in the debtors' real estate lo-
cated somewhere in the United States? How would U.S. courts react if
the foreign state applied similar standards of "comity" towards the
United States? Would U.S. courts be willing to give that which they
are willing to take? Let us imagine a hypothetical case where a bank-
ruptcy court in Liechtenstein (the European Delaware) issues such an
injunction. How would Liechtenstein fare in the United States given
the fact that its status as a corporate home away from home was as
controversial as Delaware's?' 9 6
A. U.S. Domestic Control
The general answer is that in final analysis the U.S. controls
the extraterritorial effects of foreign reorganizations. Bankruptcy
Code § 304 represents a "modified universalism."' 9 7 The intent is "to
deal ... with the legal effect the United States courts will give to for-
eign bankruptcy proceedings"'98 as defined in the Bankruptcy Code
§ 101(23). The overriding purpose is to prevent piecemeal distribution
192 Cf. Airbus Industries GIE v. Patel, 2 All E.R. 257 (H.L. 1998); British Airways
Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1 A.C. 58 (H.L. 1985); Bernhard Grossfeld & C. Paul
Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts in International Ec-
onomic Law, 32 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 931 (1983).
193 Cf Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (Eng.).
194 In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
195 Cf. Yoder v. Yoder, 330 A.2d 825, 826 (1974).
196 See In re Bank of Credit & Commerce, S.A., 4 All E.R. 796 (Q.B. 1966) (describ-
ing the U.K. proceedings in the BCCI case); E. Bruce Leonard, The International
Year in Review, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24 (2001) (describing the Canadian scene);
LoPucki, A Post-Universalist Approach, supra note 4, at 718.
197 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Insolvencies: The Lessons of Maxwell
Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2533 (1996).198 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir. 1985).
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of a debtor's estate. But it is not an unconditional giving way. Section
304 authorizes, but does not require, action by the bankruptcy court to
protect the assets of the foreign estate against creditors and to order
turnover to the foreign proceeding. It reserves -to local courts discre-
tion to evaluate the fairness of home country procedures and to protect
the interests of local creditors."' 9 9 Therefore, the interest of "local
creditors" reigns supreme. Creditors remain free to proceed with their
claims against the debtor, and liquidate the debtor's U.S. assets, if the
bankruptcy courts abstain from action.2 ° °
Consequently, the U.S. bankruptcy courts are the final arbiters
to exert control over the assets of a foreign estate and, thus, retain
domestic authority over the liquidation of such assets within U.S.
territories.
The bankruptcy court will evaluate the foreign bankruptcy sys-
tem. Section 304(c)(4) mandates that the distribution of proceeds of
such estate is "substantially in accordance with the order prescribed
by this title."20 1 This indicates that the United States wants to keep
final control over the issue of who distributes the proceeds to whom. A
199 Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communica-
tion Corp.i, 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
200 LoPucki, A Post-Universalist Approach, supra note 4, at 727.
201 In 2001, the House and Senate approved chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which covers ancillary and other cross-border cases. It currently awaits reconcilia-
tion. Proposed § 1507b) is the new version of § 304(c) and is substantially
modeled on § 3044c). The proposed text of the House and Senates versions
§ 1507(b) are identical and read as follows:
In determining whether to provide additional assistance
under this title or under other laws of the United States, the
court shall consider whether such additional assistance, consis-
tent with the principles of comity, will reasonably assure -
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or in-
terests in the debtor's property,
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims
in such foreign proceeding-,
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions
of property of the debtor,
(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor's property sub-
stantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
and
(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceedings
concerns.
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bankruptcy court's decision not to yield to a foreign proceeding is re-
viewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.2 °2
B. Comity
Certainly, comity should be a "two-way street."20 3 But the
problem is whether we apply the same "comity" both ways: as limits to
our extraterritorial ambitions and to the extraterritorial ambitions of
others. Section 304(c)(5) also refers to comity 20 4 "as the ultimate con-
sideration in determining whether to provide relief under section
304."2° The general standard of comity applied towards foreign reor-
ganizations is taken from Hilton v. Guyot:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere cour-
tesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive and judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protections of its laws 20 6
The Court gave the following list of requirements for comity. It
required the opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court
of competent jurisdiction, a regular proceeding after due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant, an impartial administration of
justice between the citizens of country and those of other countries. In
addition, there must be an absence of prejudice in the court or in the
system of law under which the court is sitting; there should be no
fraud in procuring the judgment.
C. Foreign Debtor/Foreign Assets
The outcome is often clear when the debtor is a foreign corpora-
tion and when its principal assets are located abroad. "American
courts have consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in liq-
uidating or winding up the affairs of their own domestic business enti-
ties."2 7 But location of the assets seems to have reigned supreme.
202 Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 656 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998).
203 Id. at 657.
204 See Finanz AG Zuerich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999).
205 The Bank of New York & JCPL Leasing Corp. v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 2001).
206 159 U.S. 113 (1895); cf. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 655.
207 In re Spanish Cay Co., 161 B.R. 715, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (quoting
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Serv. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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The In re Spanish Cay Co. court put the primary focus on comity and
location and stated:
The Debtor is a Bahamian corporation, its princi-
pal asset a Bahamian island. The Island has been
pledged to creditors under debentures which were exe-
cuted under Bahamian law and which provided for the
rights of the parties to be determined under Bahamian
law. Furthermore, the expert witness on Bahamian law
... stated that the laws of the Bahamas regulating the
sale of real estate would not be preempted by the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the Debtor by a United States
Bankruptcy Court. Based upon these considerations, the
Court concluded that the principle of comity required
that it respect the paramount interests of the Common-
wealth of the Bahamas and its laws governing both the
insolvency of its domestic corporations and rights with
respect to real property located in the Bahamas.2"s
Apparently the real property aspect weighed heavily on the
court:
While the Court could have attempted to fashion
relief in the United States bankruptcy proceedings
through personal jurisdiction over [Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce] and other creditors, and its ability to
order those subject to its jurisdiction to take certain ac-
tions in the Bahamas, the Court deemed it inappropriate
to attempt to accomplish indirectly that which it could
not do directly because on the limitations on its jurisdic-
tion over Bahamian real property.2 ° 9
This issue was elaborated at length in the Supplemental
Opinion:
Applying the principle of comity and deferring to
the Bahamian courts and Bahamian law to govern any
insolvency proceeding with respect to this Debtor is ap-
propriate here since (1) the Debtor is a Bahamian Com-
pany and (2) the Debtor's principal asset is real property
located in the Bahamas. These facts weigh heavily in
favor of abstention and dismissal of these proceedings.
The courts of the Bahamas have the greatest interest in
liquidating the assets of the Debtor. Moreover, it is a ba-
sic tenet of international law that real property should
208 Id.
209 Id.
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be governed by the laws of the country in which the prop-
erty is located.2 1 °
The court also considered, under the comity analysis, the rights
of all persons who are under the protection of the laws of the United
States:
As a matter of law, creditors dealing with the
Debtor knew or should have known that they were deal-
ing with a Bahamian company and that they would be
bound by the laws of the Bahamas. The law is clear that"every person who deals with a foreign corporation im-
pliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign gov-
ernment, affecting the powers and obligations of the
corporation with which he voluntarily contracts as the
known and established policy of that government
authorizes.
In this case both the Debtor and its creditors rea-
sonably expected that Bahamian insolvency law would
govern. In loan documents between the Debtor and
CIBC, the parties specifically contracted for Bahamian
law to apply.... In negotiating the mortgage the Debtor
advised P. B. Davis in writing that the mortgage must
provide for venue in the Bahamas and for Bahamian law
to apply in any litigation. Thus, both the Debtor and its
major creditors expected that Bahamian law would gov-
ern any insolvency proceeding of this Debtor.2 1 1
The court did not accept the argument that Bahamian law did
not provide for reorganization:
The potential for a successful Chapter 11 reor-
ganization in this case is questionable, at best, since cer-
tain orders of this court this Court may be given no effect
in the Bahamas.... This Court could not prevent Baha-
mian citizens and the Bahamian governmental agencies
from proceeding with their claims against the Debtor
during the pendency of this bankruptcy case.21 2
210 Id. (quoting El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zink Co., 575 F.Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y
1983) (stating "It is well settled that where rights to real property are in issue, the
law of the situs of the property controls.").
211 Id. (quoting Matter of Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
212 Id.
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D. Foreign Debtor/U.S. Assets
The location of the assets in the United States was decisive in
Underwood v. Hilliard.213 This case dealt with a corporation incorpo-
rated in the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis, a Common-
wealth Caribbean island ("Horatio Nelson, later Admiral Lord Nelson.
was married in Nevis"). 2 14 The court considered that "all of Rimsat's
assets (save a bank account with only $1,700 in it), creditors and
shareholders are located outside of Nevis."2 1 s Therefore Nevis may be
an "inconvenient forum" to be "still another reason not to abstain in
favor of it."2 16
The court concluded:
Given the location of the debtor's headquarters
and financial assets, the uncertainty concerning the ex-
act nature of the Nevis receivership, and in the absence
of any indication that U.S. bankruptcy law requires a
resolution of the disputes among the debtor's sharehold-
ers and creditors that would offend the principles that
Nevis would apply.., it is evident that the bankruptcy
court in Fort Wayne provides a more suitable and conve-
nient forum for the resolution of these disputes than the
court in Nevis.2 1 7
E. U.S. Creditors/U.S. Assets
The case most on point for our discussion is In re Treco where
the court discussed § 304(c)(4) in view of a bankruptcy proceeding in
the Bahamas.2 1 A secured U.S. creditor (secured on assets in the
United States) held a claim that was subject to diminution by adminis-
trative expenses in the Bahamas but not in the United States. The
court discussed the matter "in light of all the circumstances"2 1 9 and
came to the conclusion that violating the "order of priority accorded to
various types of creditors" would be inconsistent with U.S. standards
for the special protected status of secured creditors.22 °
The court distinguished between the "macro systematic con-
cepts" of the first three factors of the Bankruptcy Code § 304(c)(1-4)
(just treatment of all claimholders: prejudices or inconveniences for
213 Underwood v. Hilliard, 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996).
214 Id. at 959.
215 Id. at 964.
216 Id. at 962.
217 Id. at 963.
2"s The Bank of New York & JCPL Leasing Corp. v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d
148, 158-60 (2d Cir. 2001).
219 Id. at 156.
220 id.
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U.S. claimholders; inadequate protection against the risks of preferen-
tial or fraudulent dispositions2 2 1 ) from the fourth factor.2 2 2 This
fourth factor requires U.S. courts to consider differences of law "in de-
termining whether affording comity will be repugnant to American
public policies."22 3
The court emphasized that it was not creating a presumption
against affording comity to Bahamian bankruptcy proceedings. 22 4 It
did refer to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause that prohibits the
taking of "private property... for public use, without just compensa-
tion."22 5 If the claim were secured, then § 304 took care of the matter;
if it were unsecured, then it would not be "property" for purposes of the
takings clause.22 6 The court also held that a forum selection clause
does not preclude a court from granting comity where it is otherwise
warranted.2 2 7
However, the consequence of In re Treco seems to be far reach-
ing. It gives bankruptcy courts greater discretion to protect creditors
and it opens up more "gray areas." How much disparate treatment
will be tolerated? Ronald J. Silverman describes the outlook as
follows:
Treco.. .indicates that any significant difference
in ordering is susceptible to attack in an ancillary pro-
ceeding. The court's broad language might also allow for
the application of the principles enunciated in Treco to
unsecured creditors as well. Seemingly, any significant
departure from the ordering scheme set forth in the
Bankruptcy Code may now be vulnerable to attack in an
ancillary proceeding brought in the United States.2 2 s
F. Fundamental Fairness
In addition, courts look for fundamental fairness. The question
comes up when the transfer to a foreign proceeding places the risk of
221 See Finanz AG Zuerich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir.
1999) (discussing factors of procedural fairness).
222 In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 158.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 161.
225 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
226 In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 161 (referring to Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935), finding that government action which took the"property of individuals mortgages in order to relieve the necessities of individual
morgagors" to be a compensable taking).
227 Id. at 163.
228 Ronald J. Silverman & Helder P. Pereira, The International Scene: Second Cir-
cuit Explores Parameters of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 20 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 14 (May
2001).
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currency fluctuations on the creditor. This danger occurs when the
claim will be converted into the currency of the foreign state. How-
ever, courts take into account that Bankruptcy Code § 502(b) also de-
termines the amount "in lawful currency of the United States."229
There is, however, a proviso: it might be fundamentally unfair if the
early conversion of a creditor's claim into foreign currency would
render the debt unenforceable or valueless. 2 30
G. Foreign Discharges
There is presently no case concerning the recognition of foreign
discharges in the United States. The Transnational Insolvency Project
discussed this absence in U.S. jurisprudence:
There is no significant authority in the United
States as to United States recognition of a foreign dis-
charge when the United States was the primary insol-
vency jurisdiction. In general, it would seem that
modified universalism would look to the primary juris-
diction for a centralized Discharge, but it is difficult to
anticipate the circumstances that would raise the ques-
tion if the United States was the primary jurisdiction
and the discharge was granted elsewhere. 23 1
H. Full Faith and Credit-Analogy
Additional insights into the probability of negative U.S. reac-
tions might be derived from the Full Faith and Credit Clause.23 2 In
Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.2 3 the U.S. Supreme Court considered such
a case. There, the parties had agreed to a permanent injunction bar-
ring one of them from testifying as a witness in any later litigation
between them. A Michigan county court accordingly entered the in-
junction. Afterwards, plaintiffs who were not involved in the Michigan
case subpoenaed the concerned party to testify before a Missouri court.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the party could testify in the Mis-
souri action without offending the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2 3 a
The Court argued that orders commanding action or inaction
were not enforceable in a "sister State" when they purported to accom-
229 Finanz AG Zuerich v. Banco Economico SA., 192 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2003)).21o See id.; Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850,
853-54 (2d Cir. 1997).
231 INL-r' STATEMENT, supra note 74, at § III(C)(6).
232 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
233 Baker, 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
234 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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plish "an official act within the exclusive province of that other
State."2 35 It should be noted, however, that the Court added the pro-
viso: "such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and
obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation."236
The Court also held that a court in one State, "in a proper case, could
compel a defendant before it to convey property situated in another
State." '2 3 7 For a "proper case," we have to look into the cases quoted by
the court, in particular Fall v. Eastin.23" There, the Supreme Court
held that a decree is ineffective to transfer title in another state.2 3 9
With regard to injunctions, however, the Court said, "[t]he territorial
limitation of the jurisdiction of courts of a State over the property in
another State has a limited exception... but it is an exception well
defined."2 4 Robertson v. Howard,241' also alluded to "a proper case,"
and in Cole v. Cunningham24 2 we find the definition of the exception.
The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that a Massachusetts court
could issue a decree "restraining citizens of that Commonwealth from
the prosecution of attachments suits in New York brought by them for
the purpose of evading the laws of their domicile."24 3
The Supreme Court's decision brings us back to what we heard
before: evasion is the decisive point of view.2  Outside this aspect,
courts of one state should refrain from interfering with the regulation
of assets located in another state against creditors that are not parties
to the reorganization proceedings.
I. Drapery of Illusion
Overall, U.S. courts are not likely to welcome foreign injunc-
tions that are contrary to policies or prejudicial to interests of the
United States.2 4 5 Not only is this unfriendliness a response to major
235 Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 236 (quoting Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254 (1913)).
238 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
239 Id. at 8 (quoting Watts v. Waddle, 31 U.S. 389, 400 (1838))
240 Id.
241 Robertson, 229 U.S. at 26 (indicating the ability of a court in equity, in a
proper case, to compel a defendant to convey property located in another state).
242 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
243 Id at 111.
244 See id.; see also Richard W. Raushenbush, Note, Antisuit Injunctions and In-
ternational Comity, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1039, 1049 n.60 (1985).
245 Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 855 (2d
Cir. 1997) (stating two main interests of the United States are encouraging partic-
ipation in debt resolution processes and ensuring that debts owed to the United
States are enforceable).
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differences, but also to "relatively minor differences."24 6 As under-
stood in Hartford Fire, a "conflict" with U.S. law is a violation of an
express prohibition by U.S. law and such a sharp contrast is not re-
quired. Comity, then, is a dual standard concept. In reality it often
serves only as a "drapery of illusion" that "disguises the protectionism
lurking beneath."24 ' The different concepts of comity undermine the
universalist paradigms on which the cross-border concept of reorgani-
zation is based.2 s
IX. CONCLUSION
This article does not suggest that somebody has to be blamed.
Life is not yet as global, and interests in reorganization proceedings
are not yet as homogeneous, as some "universalists" might want us to
believe. Global fictions meet local geography: they have not yet
reached a balance. Due to the continuing inconsistencies it is almost
inevitable that comity often has two widely different faces. One face
looks suspiciously at foreign courts' activities, while the other face
looks more leniently at the actions of domestic courts. It is a perfect
example that the same abstract notion is filled with different pictures
taken from different geographical positions. The legal formats control-
ling the hermeneutics work silently and are normally undisclosed-
sometimes even taboo.249 With terms that are "chameleons" by neces-
sity, we are completely "lost in translation." A fair compromise is
hardly possible in international reorganizations where imperfect infor-
mation and credible commitment are still difficult to match. Conse-
quently, we wait to learn whether international treaties will settle
these problems in the near future.250
246 LoPucki, A Post-Universalist Approach, supra note 4, at 730.
247 Mary Elain Knecht, The "Drapery of Illusion" of Section 34 - What Lurks Be-
neath: Territoriality in the Judicial Application of Section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 13 U. PA. J. LN-r'L Bus. L. 287, 288 (1992).
248 Id., (recognizing protectionist motivation behind the usurpation of interna-
tional comity).
" Cf Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Law as a Comprehensive Approach. A
European Tribute to Professor Jack A Hiller, 1 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1, 14
(2000) (describing the importance of analyzing the unwritten and unspoken).
200 Bernhard Grossfeld, Loss of Distance: Global Corporate Actors and Global Cor-
porate Governance - Internet v. Geography, 34 INT. LAw. 963, 985-86 (2000); see
also PRLNCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG
THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Tentative Draft,
April 14, 2000).
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